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Abstract
The article demonstrates the challenges of the project, 
which argues that the pro-immigration policy of the 
Otto man/Turkish governments (1774–1989) was shaped 
by political concerns (concretely population and identi-
ty politics), in addition to humanitarian concerns. The 
pro-immigration policy, and more specifically the open-
door policy, facilitated, encouraged, compounded, and 
even in some cases produced immigration. In other 
words it functioned as a “pull factor”. As a working pa-
per, this article will analyse epistemological, methodo-
logical and theoretical challenges that emanate from 
the scope of the topic. To examine two centuries of 
migration covering a territory extending to three con-
tinents and including millions of migrants, as well as 
those they were directly or indirectly tied to, is indeed 
quite a challenge.
Introduction
Turkey is one of the largest shelter countries in the 
world, hosting four million Syrian refugees (as asylum 
seekers/sığınmacı in Turkey) in the last decade. It has 
never been easy to host millions, creating social, politi-
cal and economic problems. The anti-refugee attitude, 
which was seen mainly amongst the anti-government 
circles contributed to the governing party’s (AKP) losses 
in the 2019 local elections. To counter growing anti- 
refugee feelings and to justify their open-door1 policy 
since 2011, the AKP has argued that the reason for 
hosting millions of refugees is mainly the cruelty of 
the Assad regime and solely out of humanitarian con-
cern. With this discourse, the AKP would like to place 
the burden of responsibility for their open-door policy 
(hereafter, the ODP) on the “push factors”. However, 
the AKP government changed its pro-migration policy 
by de facto totally closing the borders in 2016, later de 
jure, to the Syrians. Turkey constructed a wall on the 
Turkish-Syrian border. Through the military operation 
in 2019 (Barış Pınarı), the government aimed to create 
a “security zone” in Northern Syria for the refugees in 
Turkey. During the 2019 Idlib crisis, the government 
1   The “Open-Door Policy” was initially used to refer a system of 
trade in China open to all countries equally, in the early 20th 
century. The term has been used in the last decades, especially in 
migration studies, to refer to the free circulation of people/individ-
uals. In other words, the open-door policy allows people to (e/im)
migrate freely.
risked war with the Syrian government to stop the flight 
of Syrans from Idlib. Furthermore, the government al-
lowed the refugees to accumulate at the Greek border 
in order to force the EU to continue the economic sup-
port promised by the Convention of 2015 and to react 
to the humanitarian crisis in Idlib. This change clearly 
demonstrates the complexity of migration2 policy that 
has never been solely determined by humanitarian but 
also by population and identity concerns. Moreover, 
the shift in the government’s stance likewise shows the 
contribution of the open-door policy to migration more 
than the push factors, with the Syrians subject to perse-
cution in their home country. This complexity could be 
also seen in the long span of Ottoman/Turkish immi-
gration history, extending over two centuries.
Hypothesis
The aim of this working paper is to demonstrate the dif-
ficulties of the project, which will examine the Ottoman/ 
Turkish governments’ immigration policies. The chal-
lenges emanate mainly from the scope of the topic. To 
examine two centuries of migration (1774–1989) cov-
ering a territory extending to three continents and in-
cluding millions of migrants, as well as those they were 
directly or indirectly tied to, is indeed quite a big chal-
lenge. The paper assumes that movement (migration/ 
mobility) and mastery of space as a relationship is a 
pattern in Ottoman/Turkish identity that is being recon-
structed today.
The hypothesis of the project is that the pro- immigration 
stance of the Ottoman/Turkish governments was 
shaped by political concerns (population and identi-
ty politics), in addition to humanitarian concerns. The 
pro-immigration policy and more specifically the ODP 
facilitated, encouraged, compounded, and even in 
some cases produced immigration; in other words, it 
functioned as a “pull factor”. The governments (i.e. Ot-
toman Empire/Turkey), via the ODP, were the main pro-
ducer of migrants. Since the ODP was shaped mainly 
by identity and population concerns, it played a role in 
2   Unless otherwise stated, the term migration/migrant will address 
the “forced” and massive inflow (immigration) towards the Otto-
man Empire and Turkey, excluding domestic and outflow migra-
tions. For details, see the discussion on the term of muhacir below.
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the homogenisation of the country. Most of the litera-
ture on Turkish migration (hereafter, literature) mainly 
argues that the the “push factors” dominated, that Ot-
toman/Turkish immigration policy was shaped mainly 
by humanitarian concerns, and that the Islamicisation 
and Turkification policies were their consequenses.
Obviously, the main reasons for massive immigration 
over the last two centuries towards the Ottoman Em-
pire and Turkey, as the literature emphasises, were push 
factors: Western/European imperial expansionism/ -
colonialism (mainly Russian, Austria-Hungarian, French)3 
and the nationalist, anti-Islam/Turkish policies of newly 
created states (mainly in the Balkans). As is also em-
phasised in the literature, the concrete factors include 
forced migration and forced resettlement, expulsion, 
fear of deportation and massacre, forced labour, taxa-
tion, military service, enforcement of new “official” lan-
guages in schools, restrictions on Muslim worship, and 
everyday racism (especially for the republican period). 
The Ottoman/Turkish governments opened its doors to 
these populations, who escaped their country of origin 
to save their lives, wealth, and beliefs. 
Nevertheless, the push factors are not enough to ex-
plain the immigration of millions of Muslims and Turks 
over a period of two centuries. First, push factors did 
not always result in the migration of all Muslims/ Turks. 
Push factors produced migration in some cases, but 
not all cases. A push factor by itself does not necessari-
ly generate migration. Second, the door was not always 
open for all people, even though they suffered similar 
persecution, i.e similar push factors. What ever the rea-
son for migration, the closing door slowed down and 
even stopped migration. In other words, the host coun-
try’s policy (mainly the ODP) also determined migra-
tion, i.e. the number of people able to migrate. Third, 
through the aid and exemptions they provided, the Ot-
toman/Turkish governments aimed to attract Muslims 
and Turks to migrate and settle in their territory. Fourth, 
3    Although the Austro-Hungarian regime in Bosnia did not intend to 
drive Muslims out, the change in power caused migration/emigration.
even in some cases, the 
Ottoman/Turkish govern-
ments were the main driv-
ers of immigration, by call-
ing for emigration.
Indeed, the door has been 
always open, but only for 
some groups in accordance 
with the population and 
identity policy of Ottoman/
Turkish governments. And 
the ODP, as a pull factor, 
had big impact on the 
migration of Muslims and 
Turks. The Ottoman Em-
pire had an ODP for Mus-
lims who directly had a 
migrant status until 1908, 
while non-Muslims could 
only be accepted as ref-
ugees and yet never in 
mass. The pro-migration policy for Muslims and Turks 
was abandoned especially between 1913 and 1923. 
The successor state, Turkey had the ODP only for those 
of Turkish “descent” and “culture”. The migrant status 
was not granted to non- Muslims, and very few individ-
ual refugee claims were accepted. Although Turkey 
opened the door to Syrians, they are still not consid-
ered to be “migrants”, nor “refugees,” but rather only 
“asylum seekers”. 
In these pro-migration policies, population and identity 
concerns were essential alongside humanitarian con-
cerns. The status as a migrant, a refugee, or asylum 
seeker was determined by the collective identity of the 
applicant, and not solely by the conditions they were 
subjected in their countries of origin.  
In effect until 1912, the ODP for Muslim migrants was 
adopted in a period when the Ottoman Empire de-
sired population growth for economic, military, and 
political needs. In 1856, the empire sent out a call 
for migrants, making clear that those who migrat-
ed would have aid (land, property, sustenance, even 
salary) and time-bound exemptions (military and tax). 
The Meclis-i Tanzimat justified this call by emphasising 
that it would increase the number of subjects in the 
empire.4 The promises clearly encouraged migration 
to the Dar al- Islam. The commission founded by Ab-
dulhamid II, namely Muhacirin-i İslamiye Komisyonu, 
was charged with encouraging Muslims to migrate to 
the empire in order to increase both the number and 
proportion of Muslims in all regions of the empire. It 
was thanks to the arriving Muslim migrants that the 
proportion of Muslims in Istanbul increased from 44 to 
61 per cent in a period of only three decades between 
1884 and 1914.5 The governments between 1913 and 
1923, on the other hand, closed the borders and had an 
anti- migration policy. For this reason, despite two de-
structive wars (World War I and the War of Independ-
4   Gülsoy 1996: 57.
5   Karpat 1985: 170, 190.
Fig. 1: An iconic paint of the 1864 Caucasian migrants. A section from “The mountaineers 
leave the aul” of Pyotr Nikolayevich Gruzinsky (1837–1892).
working papers 28 · 2021 · 3www.leibniz-zmo.de
ence) and despite the suffering of Turks and Muslims 
in Anatolia, massive migration did not take place. With 
the exchange of population in 1923, the newly created 
Turkish Republic further closed its open door by limiting 
admission only to those who identified with the “Turk-
ish descent and culture” (Türk soyu ve kültürü). Need-
less to say, Islamic belonging was essential. The Turkish 
Republic first wanted to make up for the population 
that had perished in the wars, in Atatürk’s words “eksik 
nüfus” (missing population) and, second, to increase 
the proportion of Turks. The door was opened to Mus-
lims and Turks that had been oppressed and persecut-
ed by nation- states in the Balkans. While the migrants 
wanted to protect their Islamic and Turkish identity by 
settling in Anatolia, they simultaneously transformed 
the empire and the republic.
The Ottoman/Turkish migration codes made it clear 
who was not allowed to immigrate. Both the Ottoman/
Turkish regulations officially denied access to “Gypsies”, 
anarchists, spies, and those with epi demic diseases. 
Although not explicity in the regulations, non-Muslims 
were essentially barred from immigrating. For exam-
ple, half of those who came to take refuge via a Rus-
sian ferry in 1905 were rejected because they were 
non- Muslim.6 The republican period further limited mi-
gration. After the establishment of the republic, some 
of the “old” Ottoman subjects who were outside the 
borders and wanted to “return”, such as the Ottoman 
Greeks and Armenians, were not accepted.7 The repub-
lican settlement laws granted migration rights only to 
those of “Turkish culture and descent”.8 Thus, among 
the various rejected groups were Balkan “Gypsies” (in-
cluding Muslims, but especially Christian ones), Roma-
nians, and Russian Jews. Likewise, in the 1940s, Jews 
with Turkish citizenship and living in France who de-
sired to return to Turkey were refused.9 The door was 
also closed to some Turks during the republican period: 
Christian Turks (Gagauz) from Romania, Muslim Turks 
from Western Thrace and Alexandrette (Hatay), “Shia” 
Turks, Cyprus Turks, and Iraqi Turkmens. These groups 
either lived in disputed countries (where the population 
size determined the fate) or in neigbouring regions.10 
Paradoxically, although Iraqi Turkmens were more op-
pressed than Bulgarian Turks (especially in the period 
6   Tuna [newspaper], 92, 20 Kanuni evvel 1321, 4, cited by Yılmaz, 
1996: 593.
7   BCA.30-18-1-1.4.52.19 (12.03.1922) and BCA.30-10-117.815.19 
(15.05.1945); see also Çağaptay 2006: 71, 87.
8   Law code of the 885 dated 31 May 1926, and of the 2510 dated 21 
June 1934. For the analysis of this law see, Erol Ülker, “Assimilation, 
Security and Geographical Nationalization in Interwar Turkey: The 
Settlement Law of 1934”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, 7, 
2008, Demographic Engineering – Part I. http://ejts.revues.org/
index2123.html, accessed 15 December 2019.
9   C. Guttstadt, Die Türkei, die Juden und der Holocaust, Assoziation 
A, 2008.
10  Hersant 2008; see also M. Pınar, “Tek Parti Döneminde Gagauzlar 
(Gökoğuzlar)”, Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce ergisi 4 (12), 2017: 
96–119; K. Kirişçi, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immi-
gration Practices”, Middle Eastern Studies 36 (3), 2000: 1–22. 
1936–1958), they were not allowed to migrate to Turkey.11
These preliminary historical observations lead to the 
following set of questions relevant to the project’s hy-
pothesis: How did population and identity concerns 
influence the pro-migration policy, and when and why 
did they change? Why does a push factor lead some to 
migrate, but not everyone affected? What makes some-
thing a push factor? How did Islam and/or Turkism play 
a role in migration? What was the official definition of 
identity (Muslim, Turk) and its impact on migration? 
What was the impact of the transformation of the state 
system from empire to republic on migration policy? Do 
the imperial and republican migration policies reflect 
the character of each system? Or was the Ottoman 
migration policy exceptional and different from other 
empires’ migration policies? What were the differ ences 
between Turkey’s immigration policies and those of 
other nation states? How did the territorial mentality 
and knowledge (from canonical to secular territorial 
concepts) shape the state’s migration policy? Why and 
how did the number of migrants matter? When did mi-
gration take place the most: in times of war or peace? 
Was there any anti-emigration movement among Mus-
lims and Turks in their home countries? And who were 
they, intellectuals or nobles? Why did religious leaders 
encourage Muslim migration? What is the significance 
of migration as a myth, as cultural knowledge and in-
tergenerational memory in the identity narratives of 
the Anatolian populations?
As these questions demonstrate, the examination 
of the identity and population dimensions of the 
Ottoman/ Turkish pro-migration policies contains 
great challenges; epistemological, methodological, 
and theoretical. 
Epistemological and methodological challenges
The epistemological difficulties derive from terminology 
and, especially, sources. In this section, the paper will 
demonstrate the difficulties that derive from changes 
in migration terms, the literature, and archives. The 
majority of the migration literature published in Turkish 
and in Turkey argues that the Ottoman Empire and the 
Turkish Republic always kept their doors open for all 
incoming migrants. Both the Empire and Republic are 
portrayed as having handled the question of incom-
ing migrants with a humanitarian approach without 
due attention to the shifting social, political, historical, 
and economic conditions, in general, and the official 
concerns about population and identity, in particu-
lar. The hypothesis will be refined by examining these 
epistemological problems, by explaining the following 
questions: Why and how does the term muhacir create 
problems? Who counted as muhacir in the Ottoman/
Turkish contexts? Why does it differ from its universal 
and its literal meaning? What is the difference between 
muhacir and mülteci (migrant and refugee)? What are 
the problems in the literature? What is the importance 
of the Ottoman/Turkish archives in migration studies? 
In the current literature, what factors are emphasised 
for migration, i.e. push or pull factors? 
11  Kalaycı 2014: 199.
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Then, the paper moves on to the methodological dif-
ficulties originating from the spatial, temporal, and 
quantitative size as well as the complexity of the topic. 
Complexity also derives from movement. The society, 
politics, economy, and more importantly frontiers were 
all in constant fluctuation, during which time migra-
tion acted as a centripetal force. The period covered 
in this study was thus chaotic, painful, and troubling. 
The paper demonstrates that each period of migration, 
shaped by multiple actors and factors, needs to be ex-
amined in the longue durée, by freezing time. How can 
one examine and generalise migration policies that 
also changed in terms of time and space as well as 
according to the size of population and the size of the 
migrants? How best to study a timespan that was by 
no means homogenous/linear, but rather intense, trou-
bling and chaotic? What was the character of the peri-
ods during which the migrations took place? 
Following the methodological difficulties facing this 
study, the paper will focus on the questions of magni-
tude and nonuniformity of territory. The Ottoman and, 
to a lesser degree, republican lands included a popu-
lation with multiple and, at times, conflicting racial, 
religious, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identities that 
forced the governments to be pragmatic and flexible 
in their policies. How best to study the multi-spatial 
empire based on a study of various regions? How can 
we generalise these spaces? The last methodological 
difficulty is due to the size of the data pertaining to 
both migrants and the population at large. Underlining 
the need for reliable data in both the Ottoman/Turkish 
cases, I focus on the following two questions: How can 
we distinguish the cases and policy of exceptions ver-
sus principles, and individuals versus masses? Why is 
it important to measure the historical sequence of mi-
grations?
The final part of this study sheds light on theoretical dif-
ficulties. It applies the historical research method that 
uses findings to derive concepts. The main question to 
answer when the project is accomplished is: Which the-
ory (or theories) could best explain such a sensitive and 
macro-scale topic? More specifically, what theoretical 
paradigm(s) can best work to understand the Ottoman- 
Turkish ODP ?
Epistemological challenges; scholarship and archives
Epistemological difficulties are due to the limits of ter-
minology, archives, and literature. More specifically, 
they are tightly tied to the “power” that determines tax-
onomies and knowledge. The most important term that 
comes to the fore is muhacir (literally, migrant) which 
is different from the present-day understanding of the 
term. 
Some of the Ottoman mi-
gration cases were very 
different from migration 
to Europe today, and had 
a different meaning than 
the international legal 
regulations. Some move-
ments deemed migration 
by the Ottoman state and 
today’s literature were in 
fact population transfers 
implemented by the army 
and governments during, 
for example, the with-
drawal of the Ottoman 
army during the 1877–
1878 Russo- Ottoman War, 
the 1912–1913 Balkan 
Wars, and so on. Rather 
than “immigration”, they 
were “internal migration”. 
Some immigrations (from the Balkans, especially from 
the southern Balkans, in its precise Ottoman name 
Rumeli, including the Macedonian region) were “post- 
colonial migration”, as newer literature distinguishes 
it from general immigration.12 While most of the mi-
grants were former Otto man subjects, only very few 
migrated from a third country. The Christians that emi-
grated from Hungary and Poland were called refugees, 
not migrants. 13
Besides this uniqueness of these Ottoman migration 
cases, the difficulty concerning the use of terms related 
to migration (muhacir, göçmen, mülteci, sığınmacı) de-
rives from their being uncertain, subjective, and chang-
ing. Indeed, these terms but especially muhacir were 
not clearly defined, mainly because they were all politi-
cally, ethically, and religiously charged terms. Muhacir, 
for instance, can be literally translated as “migrant”, 
yet it bears a strong “religious” component as it specif-
12  Interestingly, an important part of the studies on Balkan migrations 
claim that the muhacirs were the descendants of those who had pre-
viously been resettled in the Balkans, i.e. evlad-ı fatihan. For instance, 
Paşaoğlu argues that “the immigration following the 1876 war; is the 
scene of return back of the Ottoman settler in Balkans in 14th and 
15th centuries” (2013: 349). See also, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Evlad-i Fatihan, 
TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, V.11, Istanbul, 1995: 524–525, https://isla-
mansiklopedisi.org.tr/evlad-i-fatihan, accessed 11 January 2020.
13  Saydam 1997: 82. 
Fig. 2: 1878 Migrants. The Illustrated London News, September 1, 1877, 213.
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ically refers to a “Muslim migrant”.14 The term mülteci, 
on the other hand, was mainly used for non-Muslims 
(i.e. “undesired migrant”), and Muslims who had mi-
grated irregularly. 
The imperial and republican governments used these 
terms related to migration from the late 18th through 
the late 20th centuries.15 Muslims escaping from wars 
and/or conflict zones that would be considered as refu-
gees under international law were deliberately defined 
as muhacir by Ottoman bureaucrats. For instance, the 
Muslims fleeing the Russian army during the 1877–1878 
war were called muhacir, but those fleeing during World 
War I were called mülteci. In other words, rather than 
the circumstances of the migration determining the ter-
minology used, the state made this decision. Put blunt-
ly, it was the government that assumed the taxo nomic 
author ity over whether to label someone a migrant. 
Similar to other cases in different parts of the world, the 
Ottoman/ Turkish governments, too, chose their own 
terms that were largely shaped by their population and 
identity politics. Nevertheless, one should also keep in 
mind that these uses were also blurry and arbitrary. The 
term muhacir was sometimes arbitrarily used as an um-
brella term. It was often used for internal migration and 
even for those displaced by government orders.16 
The meanings of these terms were also constantly 
changing in differing contexts. The difference between 
mülteci and muhacir became much more clearly de-
fined by the beginning of the 20th century. While “ref-
ugee” started to be used for the Muslims who had 
arrived during the war from territories that had not 
yet officially been abandoned, “migrant” was used for 
those who came from the territories ceded by treaties. 
This distinction became more nuanced in the 1913 
“Regulations on Migrants” (Muhacir Talimatnamesi), 
when Muslims fled to Anatolia during the Balkan Wars. 
According to these regulations, those who had received 
migration permits from their home country would be 
called migrants, but others would be called refugees. 
By the 1930s, the Arabic term muhacir was “Turkified” 
and also “secularised” with the introduction of the 
term göçmen, which was further divided into two cat-
egories: iskanlı (to be settled by government) and ser-
best (free). After the signing of the Refugee Convention 
in 1951, the term asylum-seeker (sığınmacı) was used 
more often and it took on the meaning of refugee, i.e. 
undesired migrant. Therefore, while the term mülteci 
began to refer to refugees from Europe, such as Bos-
nian refugees, the migrant status continued to be given 
to those of “Turkish descent and culture”. 
14  A. Toumarkine, 2015: 822–824.
15  Unfortunately, most of the studies of migration (especially the 
Ottoman immigration studies) do not clearly distinguish between 
a refugee and an immigrant, i.e. Cuthel and Blumi. D.C. Cuthell, 
”The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An agent in the transformation of 
Ottoman Anatolia, 1860–1866 (Turkey)“, 2005, Columbia University, 
unpublished PhD thesis; I. Blumi, Ottoman Refugees, 1878–1939: 
Migration in a Post-Imperial World, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 
2013. 
16  BOA.DH.ŞFR. 486.134 and 495.73.
The second group of epistemological problems per-
tains to the sources. Although both the archives and 
the existing literature provide the primary and second-
ary sources in this study, they are also the very prob-
lem in an investigation of the identity and population 
dimensions in the Ottoman/Turkish migration policy. 
The overwhelming majority of the studies on Ottoman/
Turkish migration from the 1770s through the 1980s 
are in Turkish and were published in Turkey. Keeping in 
mind the prevalence and significance of the phenome-
non of migration, these studies remain insufficient. In-
deed, following the Syrian refugee crisis the migration 
studies particularly increased. Often characterised by 
a discourse of security and raison d’etat, these studies 
implicitly or explicitly aim to consolidate Turkish nation-
al unity. That is why more often than not they fall into 
the trap of adopting the prevalent statist and security- 
centered discourse.17 MA and PhD theses submitted to 
Turkish universities are perhaps the best examples of 
migration studies being crisis-based and immediately 
politically oriented. The number of MA and PhD theses 
defended in Turkish universities increased enormously 
following the influx of Syrian refugees in Turkey. For in-
stance, there were 10 theses with muhacir in the title 
through 2012, but 16 between 2013–2019. There were 
813 with “göç” in the title through the end of 2012, but 
1173 between 2013–2019. At this point it must be not-
ed that the term göç is used for all kinds of migration 
(internal, worker migration etc.), while muhacir is used 
for historical migration. Yet the impact of sığınmacı on 
studies of migration can be clearly seen in the num-
ber of theses addressing the asylum issue. The theses 
including the word “asylum/sığınma(cı)” in their titles 
rose from 64 for the period 1996–2014 to 211 between 
2015 and 2019.18 
Politics determine studies of migration, both in quanti-
tative and qualitative terms. For instance, the number 
of theses examining Iraqi Kurdish refugees in 1991 and 
Kurdish internal displacement in Turkey in the 1990s 
are limited; respectively, around 20 and 10. These num-
bers demonstrate that the subject rather than object 
matters in Turkish migration studies. The other exam-
ple are the emigration topics. The emigrations of non- 
Muslims from the Ottoman Empire and Turkey has 
worked at a symbolic level. For example, there have 
been more theses on the Armenian deportation written 
in France than Turkey: 30 entitled genocide armenien19 
in France since 1997, with only 5 entitled “Armenian 
17  for example see Ü. Özdağ, Stratejik Göç Mühendisliği-İç Savaşa 
Sürüklenmek İstenen Türkiye, Kripto, 2020; see also, Saydam 1997, 
Halaçoğlu 1994, McCarthy 1995. On the other hand, theses consid-
ering the security dimension emerged around 2000, concretely 
on the forced internal displacement of Kurds because of the PKK. 
It has increased enormously since the arrival of Syrian refugees. 
Between 1999 and 2019, 70 theses examined the relationship be-
tween security and migration. More than half, i.e. 45 theses, were 
defended between 2017 and 2019. See database https://tez.yok.
gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi, accessed 20 May 2020.
18  For the theses since 1970 see database https://tez.yok.gov.tr/
UlusalTezMerkezi/giris.jsp.
19  https://www.theses.fr/, accessed 12 May 2020.
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deportation” in Turkey.20 Indeed, the favourite subject 
in the literature is not emigration, but immigration.
While the thesis and dissertation databases from Tur-
key and Europe give a view to the unpublished scholar-
ship, a glance at the published research provides a 
similar perspective. Turkish migration studies started 
with the works of Circassian and Crimean-originating 
researchers in the 1940s and the 1950s. It became a 
major focus of interest by the 1990s, mainly due to the 
“opening” of the Ottoman archives to researchers as a 
result of President Turgut Özal’s “globalising” policies. 
Perhaps more importantly, the end of the Cold War 
period contributed to a shift 
in attention from ideology to 
identity. It is also important 
to note that the pioneering 
studies in this field were un-
dertaken by academics with a 
migrant background. The per-
sonal seems to have become 
academic as their research 
interests appear to have been 
guided by their immigrant 
background,as in the cases of 
Karpat21 and Kırımlı.22 A large 
number of these studies con-
centrates mainly on the migra-
tions from the Balkans, and, to 
a lesser extent, Caucasus and 
Crimea.23
With their exclusive focus on 
push factors, these studies 
tend to ignore the impact of the promotion of migra-
tion by the state through a range of incentives such 
as aid and exemptions. Rather than accounting for the 
active role of the Ottoman and Turkish governments 
from the very beginning of the waves of migration, 
therefore, these studies tend to portray the state as a 
passive third party. One of the pioneering scholars in 
this field, Saydam, for instance, argues that the ODP 
existed since “the 13th century” and for “humanitarian 
and religious concerns”.24 
Even when they take into account the identity dimen-
sion, these studies again reflect an ill-balanced ap-
proach as they stress the anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish 
attitudes of the governments of the countries of or-
igin, failing to take into account the pro-Muslim and 
pro-Turkish policies of the host country.25 More specifi-
20  https://tez.yok.gov.tr/, accessed 20 May 2020.
21  K.H. Karpat, “The hijra from Russia and the Balkans: The Process 
of Self-definition in the Late Ottoman State”, Muslim Travellers. 
Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination, ed. by D.F. 
Eickelman and J. Piscatori, London 1990: 131–152.
22  Kırımlı, 2008.
23  For instance, there are 148 MA and PhD dissertations on migra-
tion from the Balkans, 58 for the Caucasus, and 49 on Crimea.
24  Saydam 1997: 78, 97.
25  For instance, see Karpat 2010.
cally and importantly, these researchers fail to take into 
account the pull factors such as aid and exemptions 
offered in their not-so-open-door policies.26 Although 
these were very generous in the late Ottoman Em-
pire, they decreased in the republican period. This aid 
included free land and housing in addition to exemp-
tion from military service and taxation.27 This project 
therefore argues that the ODP itself was a pull factor. 
Indeed some studies approach the Russian open-door 
policy and the exemptions it promises as pull factors,28 
although almost none of these studies consider the 
Ottoman/ Turkish ODP as such.
Although these studies aspire to emphasise push fac-
tors, their treatment remains unconvincing and dis-
satisfying. More specifically, they do not address the 
following question: although they argue that the 
Austro- Hungarian and Russian Empires pursued a 
systematic policy of expelling Muslims, why did a sig-
nificant share of Muslims not emigrate? If the expul-
sion of Muslims was centrally decided by these gov-
ernments, what official decrees and documents testify 
to such a decision? Likewise, they do not focus on the 
questions of how persecutions took place and who the 
persecutors were. It is possible to speculate however, 
that the persecutors were most probably local actors 
who acted according to their local needs rather than 
central policies. Thus, research on the local persecu-
tors (Cossacks, Christians, irregular units, etc.) is need-
ed. If the local Christian population were responsible 
for the persecution and expulsion of Muslims, then it 
is necessary to establish the social strata and regions 
involved. The policies of the states that caused the em-
igration of Muslims were neither uniform nor totally 
pro- emigration. As Pinson points out, there was not a 
“single” Russian opinion on the topic, but rather two 
26  As was noted earlier, the door was never actually very open be-
cause there have always been limits on admission based on such 
factors as religion, politics, and race.
27  Saydam 1997: 153–184.
28  Beydilli 1988: 373; McCarthy 1995: 122.
Fig. 3: Iconic photo of 1912 Balkans’ migrants. Frederick Moore, National Geographic Society.
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opposing sides: pro- emigration and anti-emigration.29 
There are documents that show that the two empires 
even tried to stop the emigration of the remaining 
Muslims. In most cases, the Austro-Hungarian and 
Russian empires were anti-migration compared to the 
Ottoman Empire.30 More Muslims remained in them 
than immigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, 
there were more Muslims in the Russian Empire than 
there were Ottoman Muslims in the last quarter of the 
19th century.31
On the other hand, despite some studies arguing 
that religious persecution was the push factor, they 
do not answer the question whether the anti-Muslim 
policy was pursued for identity purposes or political/ 
ideological purposes (that is secular and socialist, i.e. 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia)? Indeed, the main reason for 
the migration of Bulgarian Turks in 1989 was not main-
ly an anti- Muslim campaign, but rather an anti- Turkish 
campaign. If religious restrictions were the push fac-
tors, why did the others not emigrate? Despite all op-
pression and persecution, the Muslims who did not em-
igrate lived their beliefs, even developed their religions. 
For example, the success of Nüvvab madrasas in Bul-
garia has even become famous in the Muslim world.
Another common problem in the Turkish scholarship 
on migration is that there is almost no correlation es-
tablished between those who arrive and those leave. 
Immigration, from the late Ottoman Empire to the 
1980s Turkey, has been viewed as an independent pro-
cess. However, they were closely correlated, due to the 
character of the wars, that is, demographic warfare. 
The wars with Russian Empire were not only territori-
al struggles but also demographic ones. Both empires 
aimed to have more religiously uniform populations. 
For this reason, both empires had similar population 
policies: forced migration, forced settlement, and so 
on. The exchange of population has often been im-
plemented both officially, and, more often unofficially. 
There was almost a tacit agreement of an exchange of 
population (mostly on the basis of religious affiliation, 
i.e. Muslims vs Christians) between the Ottoman and 
Russian Empires. 
The wars with the newly created Balkan states also 
had the character of demographic warfare. Besides 
the mutually forced migrations during the Balkan 
Wars (1912 and 1913), there was also the obligatory 
exchange of populations between Balkan states. Such 
as the Ottoman- Greek Kingdom (1914), Ottoman-Bul-
garia (1914), and Turkey-Greek Kingdom (1923). These 
agreements contributed to the exchange of Muslims 
29  For details see Pinson 1970 and Pinson 1972.
30  For details see M. Fuhrmann, “Vagrants, Prostitutes, and Bos-
nians: Making and Unmaking European Supremacy in Ottoman 
Southeast Europe”, in Conflicting Loyalties: Social (Dis-)integration 
and National Turn in the Late and Post-Ottoman Balkan Societies 
(1839–1914), ed. by N. Clayer, H. Grandits and R. Pichler London, 
I.B. Tauris 2011: 15–45; Meyer, 2007: 15–32.
31  The first Russian census undertaken in 1897 enumerates 13,9 
million Muslims, while the 1894 Ottoman census enumerates 12,8 
million Muslims. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Empire_
Census and Karpat, 1985: 152–153, accessed 12 May 2020.
and Christians between Anatolia, Thrace, and these 
countries.
The prevalent literature also fails to address “return mi-
grations”.32 A small fraction of those who migrated to 
the Ottoman Empire and Turkey returned to their home 
countries, such as Russia and Bulgaria. The return mi-
gration was high particularly among Bosnian Muslims 
(1878–1918)33 and Bulgarian Turks (1989)34. The main 
reason was that the immigrants realised that what they 
were promised was not met. Although the governments 
attempted to limit this return migration, there was still 
quite a number of such returnees.
Another serious problem in the common Turkish 
scholar ship is that it bases arguments for push factors 
on Ottoman/Turkish archives and documents. The 
problem here is that, if emphasising push factors, then 
the first primary sources to delve into are the archives 
of the countries that pushed the Muslims out. For ex-
ample, one of the experts on migration in Turkey does 
not use one single Russian document to substantiate 
his claim regarding the “Policy of the Destruction of 
Turks by Russians”. Alongside the Ottoman/Turkish 
sources, he uses French and British newspapers and 
books.35 Justin McCarthy, too, claims in his well-known 
study that the “forced expulsion of peoples was an 
effective instrument of Russian policy” in the Cauca-
sus.36 Yet rather than using Russian documents, his 
sources are entirely based on those of Russia’s enemy, 
i.e. British archives. Turkish historian Ahmet Halaçoğ-
lu claims that Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Mon-
tenegro, and Armenia “persecuted” and “destroyed 
the Turks”. Similarly, he, too, fails to use one single 
document from these countries.37 One last example 
is Zeynep Zafer’s article “Balkan Wars and Pomaks”, 
in which she examines the “genocide and migration” 
policies of the Bulgarian state. Despite her knowledge 
of the Bulgarian language, she does not use any Bul-
garian government sources.38 
32  With some exceptions; Meyer 2007; Fuhrmann 2011: 15–45; see 
also T. Gündüz, “Bosna’ya Dönen Boşnak Göçmenlerin Türkiye 
Ve Türkler Hakkındaki Görüşleri’’, Balkanlar ve Göç, dd. Ali Fuat 
Örenç-İsmail Mangal Tepe, Bursa 2013: 165–173.
33  B. Şen, “Shuttle Back and Forth Between Two Empires: The 
Petitions of Bosnian Muslim Migrants in the Ottoman and Austro- 
Hungarian Archives at the End of the Nineteenth Century’’, Saray-
bosna, Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju, 64, 2015: 325–343.
34  For the Bulgarian Turks’ immigration see D. Vasileva, “Bulgarian 
Turkish emigration and return”, International Migration Review 26 
(2), 1992, 342–352; G. Kılıçlı, “Bulgaristan Türkü Göçmen Kadın-
larının Öz-Kimlik İnşası’’, Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi 
Dergisi 36 (1), 2019: 150–162 . 
35  İpek 1994: 14–15.
36  McCarthy 1995: 18.
37  A. Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri 
(1912–1913), TTK, Ankara 1994.
38  See for example Z. Zafer, Balkan Savaşları ve Pomaklar, 100. Yılın-
da Balkan Savaşları (1912–1913): İhtilaflı Duruşlar, Sempozyum 
Bildirileri-I, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara 2014: 351–367.
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A note on the Ottoman/Turkish archives is in order. 
The main problem is the access to some archival hold-
ings; conceretly, the Internal Ministry’s Immigration 
Commission Documents (Dahiliye Nezareti Muhacirin 
Komisyonu Evrakı, DH.MHC) and the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The holdings of DH.MHC were recently 
opened to researchers. The migration policy could thus 
far only be depicted using documents obtained from 
the files of other ministries, primarily the Interior Minis-
try. Although the funds of the Immigration Commission 
for the republican period have been opened (the To-
prak İskan Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi/General Directorate 
of Land and Settlement), they have not yet been exam-
ined critically in terms of the open-door policy. More-
over, the archives of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs are not fully opened. 
The Ottoman migration policy could become much 
more clear with the examination of the newly-opened 
holdings of the Ottoman Immigration Commission and 
the Turkish Minstry of Foreign Affairs. Until these ar-
chives are not fully examined, we will not be able to 
answer the following questions: how did the (Ottoman 
and) Turkish consulates assess the pressures against 
Muslims and Turks? How did the Ottoman/Turkish 
govern ments process migration demands, and how did 
they organise migration? Was there a different policy 
of migration and resettlement put into effect for mi-
grants coming from different countries? How could a 
researcher determine the ethnicity and region of the 
migrants? This is the most important problem, espe-
cially in the cases of simultaneous migrations from 
different regions, for example, in the migration from 
Nogay, Circassia, and Crimea in the 1850s and 1860s 
when migrants of Crimean or Circassian origin were 
not well-distinguished in the archival documents.
Another archival problem is the difficulty of accessing 
documents cited by older studies. Fonds and file num-
bers have been changed over time. It is difficult and 
indeed at times impossible to get a hold of the original 
documents cited in academic works.39
39  An important document that contains the Ottoman- Russian agree-
ment on the Circassian migrations, which was cited by Karpat, can 
Methodological questions
Examining the role of population and identity in the 
pro- migration policy poses serious methodological 
challenges stemming from the subject’s spatial, tempo-
ral, and quantitative magnitude. Indeed, it is difficult to 
examine an entire timespan of two centuries of migra-
tion taking place on three continents. Moreover, these 
three dimensions are not static, but rather continuously 
shifting.
Magnitude of time-span and its speedity
Immigration had started to become a problem by the 
1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and it acquired a mas-
sive and tragic dimension during the Crimean War in 
1853–1856, and continued until the migration of Bul-
garian Turks in 1989. 
Examining two centuries of migration carries great 
challenges. The period is long, in terms of transforma-
tion, and troubling; two “long centuries”, to borrow a 
phrase from Eric Hobsbawn. There were major trans-
formations (global, imperial/national, and regional) 
during the period; the penetration of capitalism in the 
“old world”, the ideology of nationalism and its aim 
to establish nation-states, the global conflict of the 
Great Powers, the irredentism of pan ideologies (pan- 
Hellenism, pan-Slavism, pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism 
etc.). All these played a role in migrations. As Blumi 
examined in his work Ottoman Refugees, global eco-
nomic factors had a significant impact on migrations. 
However, the factors that impacted deeply on the pop-
ulation and identity politics were imperial expansion-
isms (Russia, Austria-Hungary, France etc), nationalist 
claims, and nation-state irredentism (mainly in the Bal-
kans). All played a major role in Ottoman/Turkish mi-
gration policy, but how big a role did they play in actual 
migrations?
The changes at the “national” (Ottoman) level took 
place parallel to global changes. This period, the ”long 
century” of the Ottoman Empire, was a paradoxical 
process. On the one hand, the empire was losing land 
not be found in the Ottoman archvies; such as “FM (ID) [Hariciye, 
Idare] 177, 6513 139, 8 and 21 December 1862”, see Karpat, 1985: 67.
Fig. 4: Muslim-Turks from 
the Greek Kingdom in 
1923. 
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and population due to ongoing wars; on the other, it 
reformed its administrative structure to strengthen 
its hegemonic capacity in relation to population and 
identity. Through the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman 
Empire was undergoing a wholesale westernisation 
project. While increasing its administrative and govern-
ing capacity, the reaya (literally “flock”) became tebaa 
(subject), and finally vatandaş (citizen) with the founda-
tion of Turkey.
The real challenge of this transition/transformation is 
its amorphousness. Although 1922 and 1923 were offi-
cially the end of the empire and the foundation of the 
republic, the transition was not as sharp; the transition 
period extended over a longer time on both ends. The 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government act-
ed with “national” motives during its hold on power in the 
1908–1918 period. Following the founding of the repub-
lic, on the other hand, the Kemalist Ankara government 
benefited from Ottoman “heritage” and “experience”. 
Moreover, there were two governments (Ankara and 
Istanbul, between 1920–1923) that implemented their 
own policies, one imperial and one national. Should 
one accept this period as imperial or national, or should 
it count as both? 
During the transition from empire to republic, the pop-
ulation, identity and migration policy underwent a 
change. Indeed, in terms of migration policy, 1923 is 
not the year to make the empire-republic distinction. 
While one could observe the “nationalist” settlement 
policy during the CUP era, the Kemalist era witnessed 
imperial migration policies. It can be further argued 
that the migration policy implemented in the late Otto-
man period is similar to the migration policies adopted 
by a nation-state. Likewise, some laws and practices 
of the early republican era are the same as those of 
the Ottoman period. In other words, while the end of 
the empire shows the signs of a new stage, the early 
Republican period also carries traces of the old. More-
over, both the Ankara and Istanbul governments im-
plemented their own population and migration policies 
between 1920 and 1923. 
Besides this national level transformation, local trans-
formations also created difficulties, mainly because 
most were not synchronised with macro transforma-
tions; indeed, they may even have pursued opposing 
aims. Macro transformations had a role in increasing 
regional differences. The rate of change was higher in 
western regions and lower in eastern regions. While 
the Balkans, Thrace, and Western Anatolia were rapid-
ly “developing”, the predominantly Kurdish, Armenian, 
and Arab- inhabited eastern regions remained station-
ary. While western Muslims were more “modernised”, 
eastern Muslims became more conservative and they 
approached national and global developments differ-
ently. Another reason for this was the investments made 
in transportation and communication technologies in 
western regions (railways, telegraph etc.) With the de-
velopment of communication technologies, mobility 
and urbanisation also increased. This human mobility 
with economic incentives increased strengthened pro- 
migration sentiment in the western regions. The ques-
tion arises: were there different cultures of migration de-
pending on region and class? As yet, no study addresses 
the influence of these factors on migration to Anatolia.
Wars were the biggest factor in shaping the period, 
economically, socially and politically. They were mul-
tiple and varied: global (First World War), imperial 
(Russian-Ottoman War 1877–1878), regional (Crimean 
war 1853–1856, Balkan Wars of 1912–1913), national 
(Greco-Turkish War 1897, Turkish War of Independence 
1919–1923) and local (Cretan Rebellion 1896). Most of 
them ended with territorial losses that caused massive 
migrations. Although several studies examine these 
wars and their consequences in terms of refugee cri-
ses, any study focuses specificially on the relationship 
between wars and military conflicts and migration/ 
refugee in Ottoman/Turkish history.40 
Magnitude of space
Examining the ODP of an empire stretching to three 
continents presents huge difficulties also from the point 
of view of geography. This immense landmass includ-
ed various neighbours, “areas”, and populations. The 
neighbours of the Ottoman Empire and, to a lesser de-
gree, those of Turkey were different in terms of their 
own population characteristics, identities, and histori-
cal relationships. The eastern frontier was (and still is) 
mountainous and home to a nomadic Shia population, 
while the southern frontier was (and still is) desertlike 
with Bedouin Sunnis. The western frontier was mari-
time with a Catholic, urban population, and the north-
ern frontier was maritime and nomadic , with a Rus-
sian Orthodox population. Needless to say, different 
neighbours followed different population and identity 
policies.
Algerian Muslims fleeing French colonisation were 
welcomed more hesitantly than the Russian Muslims. 
The Ottoman officials welcomed only a few thousand 
migrants, far fewer than the millions of Russian Mus-
lims and Turks. It seems that the Tripoli muhacirs were 
less favourable than the Caucasian migrants. This 
geo graphic selection would be seen in the attitude of 
Turkey, which signed the Refugee Convention of 1951 
while maintaining geographical limits. Until the AKP 
governments, Turkey recognised the right to refugee 
status only for Europeans, the right to migration only 
for those of “Turkish descent and culture”, while the 
rest were limited to “asylum rights”.
There were three “migration zones” from which most 
migrants came: Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Bal-
kans. These regions were the predominantly Muslim- 
inhabited contact regions with the Russian and Austrio- 
Hungarian empires. The loss of these regions led to 
massive migration. The remaining migrations were 
from the Balkan countries, which mostly gained their 
independence during the Balkan Wars.41 Although the 
40  For details see F. Dündar, ”Deporting Demos, Militarizing Nations: 
Forced Migration and Conflicts in the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey (1908–1947)“, in Migration to/and From Turkey: 
Changing Patterns and Shifting Policies, ed. by A.B. Karaçay and A. 
Üstübici, Istanbul, Isis, 2014: 15–47. 
41  Besides the studies of Karpat and McCarthy, see also: S.J. Shaw, 
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migrations from these three regions experienced pe-
riods of high intensity, they were spread over a long 
period. Migrations from Crimea began when the Otto-
man Empire ceded Crimea with the 1774 Küçük Kay-
narca Treaty. The biggest migration took place during 
the Crimean War and until 1863. According to Kırımlı, 
migration lasted until 1944, especially during the years 
of 1810, 1812, 1816, 1819, 1827, 1856, 1860–62, and 
1864–65.42 The longest-lasting source of migration was 
the Caucasus, a region Islamised but never fully con-
trolled by the Ottomans. After the suppression of the 
Sheikh Shamil Rebellion against Russian expansion, the 
great migration took place in 1864. The second wave 
took place during the 1877–78 war and continued at a 
lower intensity until the collapse of the empire.43 
There were also other migrations that were different 
from preceding ones and had their own ethnic and 
regional characteristics: Nogay (1859–62),44 Batumi 
(Muslim Georgian, 1878, 1914),45 “Oriental refugees” 
(1916).46 The third region of migration was the Bal-
“Ottoman Population Movements During the Last Years of the 
Empire (1885–1914). Some Preliminary Remarks” Osmanlı Araştır-
maları 1980; A. Akgündüz, 1998: 97–120; N. İpek, İmparatorluktan 
Ulus Devlete Göçler, Serander Yayınları, Trabzon, 2006; Kale, 2014: 
252–271; Kazgan, 1970;  Kasaba, 2009. 
42  For the Crimean immigration see H. Kırımlı, “Kırım’dan Türkiye’ye 
Kırım Tatar Göçleri”, Uluslararası Göç Sempozyumu Bildiriler, 
Zeytinburnu Belediyesi, İstanbul 2006, 147–152; S. Erkan, Kırım ve 
Kafkasya Göçler, 1878–1908, Trabzon, KATÜ Kafkasya ve Orta Asya 
Ülkeleri Ara.tırma Merkezi, 1996.
43  Bice, 1991; see also Habıçoğlu Bedri, Kafkasyadan Anadoluya 
Göçler, Nart Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1993; Saydam Abdullah, Kırım ve 
Kafkas Göçleri (1856–1876), TTK Ankara 1997; and A. Toumarkine,  
Les migrations des populations musulmanes balkaniques en Ana-
tolie 1876−1913, Istanbul, ISIS, 1995.
44  64,892 Nogay migrated between 1859−1862, see D.D. Paşaoğ-
lu, ”Nogay Göçleri ve Türkiye’deki İskânları“, PhD thesis, Ankara 
Üniversitesi, 2009.
45  Özel, 2010: 477–496; see also M. Demirel, ”Artvin ve Batum 
göçmenleri (1877–1878)“, Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı’ndan Sonra, Türkiyat 
Araştırmaları Dergisi, 40, 2009: 317–340.
46  One of the rare studies on this issue, see E. Kaya, Birinci Dünya 
Savaşı ve Milli Mücadele’de Türk Mültecileri Vilâyât-ı Şarkiyye ve 
Aydın Vilâyeti Mültecileri (1915–1923), Ebabil Yayıncılık, Ankara 
2007.
kans, where multiple actors and factors played a role 
in the migrations that lasted until the 1990s. The wars 
were the main reason, beginning with the Serbian Re-
volt and reaching a massive and tragic level with the 
1877–78 Russo-Ottoman War and the Balkan Wars. 
Unlike Crimea and the Caucasus, the Christians were 
the majority in the Balkans, where the nationalist 
groups had overlapping territorial claims that drove 
“homogenisation” policies. The period of “mutual ho-
mogenisation” ended with the population exchange of 
1923. The exchange cleansed Anatolia of its authoch-
thon people comprising Ottoman Greeks and made the 
Muslim-Turkish population in Greece less “dangerous” 
in a demographic sense.47 Nearly half of the remain-
ing Turks and Muslims migrated during the republican 
period.48 There were multiple waves of migration: the 
Cretan Muslims (1898, 1923),49 the Ottoman-Greek 
exchange (1914),50 the Ottoman-Bulgarian exchange 
(1914),51 the Greek occupation kaçguns (1919–20), the 
Turkish-Greek exchange (1923), the Bulgarian Turks 
(1950, 1989) and Yugoslavia (1950s).52 
47  For the immigration from the Balkans see Y. Altuğ, Balkan-
lardan anayurda yapılan göçler, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
1991; Kocacık, 1980: 137−190; H.Y. Aganoglu, Göç: Osmanlı’dan 
Cumhuriye’te Balkanlar’ın Makus Talihi, Kum saati yay, 2001; N. 
İpek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri (1877–90), Ankara, TTK, 
1994; B. Simsir, Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, C.I-II-III, TTK, Ankara 1989; 
Halaçoğlu, 1994.
48  Geray, 1962; for more details see A. İçduygu and  İbrahim Sirkeci, 
“Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye’sinde Göç Hareketleri”, in 75 Yılda 
Köylerden Şehirlere, Tarih Vakfı, I, ed. by Oya Baydar, Istanbul, 
1999: 249-259; S. Çağaptay, ”Kemalist dönemde göç ve iskan 
politikaları: Türk kimliği üzerine bir çalışma“, Toplum ve Bilim 93, 
2002: 218-241; S. Gök, Tek Parti Döneminde Doğu ve Güneydoğu 
Anadolu’da İskan Politikaları (1923–1950), Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, 
2005.
49  S.A. Kassab, ”II. Abdülhamid Döneminde, Osmanlı Vilayetleri’ne 
İskân Edilen Giritli Göçmenler“, Osmanli Ans. 4: 697–702.
50  Ladas, 1932.  
51  S. Önder, “Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatalarında Türk Bulgar Mübadele-
si”, Anadolu üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 3 (1), 1991: 
207–225.
52  H. Öksüz and Ü. Köksal, ”Emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey 
(1923–1960)”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, 9, 2004: 145–177. 
Fig. 5: 1989 Muslim- 
Turkish Migrants from 
Bulgaria. Yeni Şafak, 
November 4, 2019.
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The Muslim emigration from Habsburg-mandated Bos-
nia and Herzegovina (1879, 1909)53 was mainly moti-
vated by a desire to live in Dar al-Islam. 
The Balkans (south of the Danube) remained main mi-
gration source region during the republican period, of 
whom the actors and factors were varied. The actors 
included the great powers, the newly created (auton-
omous) states, and nationalist groups. The Muslim mi-
grants were also varied: Turks, Bosnians, Pomaks, Alba-
nians, and so on. 
In addition to the “migration zones” listed above, the 
following migrations occurred from the territories 
that were lost to the other European powers (France, 
Great Britain, and Italy) such as Tripoli, Algeria (1848–
1900),54 and Tunisia (1881, 1908–14).55 There were very 
few migrants from “third” countries: Hungarian refu-
gees (1848, around 5000),56 Polish refugees (1774 and 
1848),57 Romanian and Russian Jews (1880s–1910s),58 
White Russian refugees (1919–1924),59 and German 
and Jewish academics (1930s). The Christian migrants 
were in general opponents of the Russian and Austro- 
Hungarian empires. 
The real challenge created by the huge territory is to 
study the post-Ottoman territories, whether in their to-
tality or indvidually. As I noted earlier, it is an area that 
spreads over three continents and corresponds to near-
ly 30 states in the present day. They are divided into nu-
merous “area studies” such as Middle East, North Afri-
ca, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Studying migration 
B. Şen, Nationalism and Migration: The Post-1950 Balkan Immi-
grants from Yugoslavia, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 
2007.
53  Bosnian Muslim immigration to the Ottoman Empire was mainly 
in 1879, as well as 1882, 1889–1902 and 1908–1909.
54  The number of Algerian immigrants was about 10,000. For details 
see Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, “Suriye’ye Yerleşen Cezayirli Muhacirler-
in Tabiiyeti Meselesi (1847–1900)”, İslâm Araştırmaları, 1, 1997: 91–
106; see also S. Samur, ”Osmanli devleti’nde cezayir göçmenleri 
ve Albdülkadir El-Geylani“, Erciyes üniversitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi 
dergisi, 8, 1992: 141–158.
55  Bardin, 1980: 162–178. According to Stiti, 223,000 Tunisian fled 
to the Ottoman Tripoli (Libya) after the French conquest in 1881. 
Most of them were repatriated by the French protectorate. See 
also Mustapha Stiti, “Tunus’un Fransızlar tarafından işgali karşısın-
da Osmanlı siyaseti (1878–1888)”, unpublished PhD thesis, İstanbul 
University, 2008, 161.
56  M.T. Gökbilgin, ”Rakozcı Ferenc II ve Osmanlı Devleti Himayesinde 
Macar Mültecileri“, Türk-Macar Kültür Münasebetleri Işığı Altında il, 
Rakozcı Ferenc ve Macar Mültecileri Sempozyumu, İstanbul, 1976,  
1–17; N. Göyünç, ”1849 ’da Macar Mültecileri ve Bunların Kütahya 
ve Halep’te Yerleştirilmeleri ile İlgili Talimatlar“, Türk-Macar Kültür, 
op.cit, 173–179; A. Refik, Türkiye‘de Mülteciler Meselesi, İstanbul, 
1926; B. Nazır, Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler. Osmanlı’ya Sıgınan-
lar, Istanbu, Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2006.
57  Nazır 2006.
58  N.I. Şeber, ”II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Rusya ve Romanya’dan 
Gelen Yahudi Muhacirler“, Tarih Dergisi, 53, 2012: 39–61; M.K. Öke, 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Siyonizm ve Filistin Sorunu, İstanbul, 1982.
59  T. Timuçin, White Russians in Istanbul: The Plight of the Russian 
Emigrees during the Years 1919–1924, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 
Bilkent Üniversitesi, 1999.
on this geographical scale also means to be in an ac-
tive dialogue with nearly 30 national historiographies. 
The national historiographies of the states that were 
established on the former Ottoman territories exam-
ine the issue of historical migrations in the “separate” 
boxes of emigration vs immigration. While immigration 
is situated within the issue of “disputed territories”, 
the emigration issue is investigated in the context of 
“liberation” and independence. In other words, while 
emigration is seen as a rescue from “Turkish-Islamic 
captivity/ turkokratia”, immigration is viewed as a result 
of persecution. Similar to the Turkish academic works 
cited earlier, these national historiographies, too, ap-
proach the issue of migration from a perspective that 
reinforces their national unity.60
Recently, various contributions in area studies in the 
US approaching migration from a regional perspective 
have been on the rise. These include the Mediteran-
nean, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Asia, the Levant, 
North Africa, Russia, the Gulf, the Caucasus, the Black 
Sea, Middle East, and the Arab World.61 Area studies 
envision their respective region as a social, cultural, 
economic, and even ideological totality. They also ana-
lyse migration in a “closed pool logic”. Their priority is 
to understand the region rather than migration. They 
may have two important contributions. They can play 
a role in understanding migration between the states 
established after the Ottoman Empire, and establishing 
a balance between national historical writings and the 
Ottoman past.62 
60  D. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its 
Impact upon Greece, Paris, 1962; Nubar, Boghos, The Pre-War 
Population of Cilicia, Paris, 1920; N. Michoff, La Population de la 
Turquie et de la Bulgarie au XVIII’ et XIX’ s.:recherches biblio-statis-
tiques, 4 vols., Sofia, 1915–1935.
61  For instance, one needs to apply to other cases the Circas-
sian studies that examine the impact of Circassian migration 
in Balkans and the Middle East, such as: V. Hamed-Troyansky, 
”Circassian Refugees and the Makıng of Amman, 1878–1914“, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 49 (4), 2017: 605–623; 
M. Dobreva, ”Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet and 
Social Integration (Preliminary Notes)“, OTAM 33, 2013: 1–30; S. 
Shami, ”Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, 
Settlement, and Self-Representations of the Circassians in Jordan“, 
Iran and the Caucasus 13 (1), 2009: 141–159.
62  See, among others: M. Cote, “Les migrations internationales 
dans le bassin méditerranéen [note critique]“, Méditerranée, 59, 
1986: 103–105; C. Schmoll, H.Thiollet and C. Wihtol de Wenden, 
Migrations en Méditerranée, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2015; I. Ninić, 
Migrations in Balkan History, Belgrade, Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, 1989; M. Morokvašic, ”Migrations et diasporas 
Migrations et diasporas: les Balkans mobiles“, Balkanologie VII (1), 
2003: 11–17; K.C. Zachariah, B.A. Prakash and S. Irudaya Rajan, 
”Gulf migration study: employment, wages and working conditions 
of Kerala emigrants in the United Arab Emirates”, CDS Working 
Paper 326, Trivandrum, CDS 2002; A. Arsan, J. Karam and A. Khater, 
“Editorial Foreword: On Forgotten Shores: Migration in Middle East 
Studies, and the Middle East in Migration Studies”, Mashriq & 
Mahjar: Journal of Middle East & North African Migration Studies 
1 (1), 2015: 1–7; D. Chatty, Displacement and Dispossession in 
the Modern Middle East, Cambridge, 2010; D.F. Heisel, Theories 
of International Migration in International Migration in the Arab 
World, vol. II, United Nations Economic Commission for Western 
Asia, 1982.
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In sum, the spatial magnitude and its heterogeneity ob-
ligate researchers to consider two other related fields, 
i.e. national and regional (area) studies. Thus, it would 
involve scaling between four levels: global history > im-
perial history > regional (area studies) > national his-
toriography. This project could overcome this scaling 
problem if it applies the understanding underlying the 
main question that the “connected history” theory asks, 
“how can we write a history of Ibero-America if we con-
sider the Spanish and Portuguese worlds as strictly dis-
tinct?”63.
Another challenge is the ethnic, racial, and religious di-
versity of the population from the Ottoman Empire to 
Turkey. These identities are multi-layered and difficult 
to categorise in distinct categories. Indeed, very few of 
them can be merged into one single ethnic and/or reli-
gious identity, such as Yezidis and Jews. Most of them 
have overlapping identities: Muslim or Catholic Albani-
ans, Gregorian or Protestant Armenians, Alevi or Sunni 
Turks etc. Most of these identities also have multiple 
offshoots: for instance, “Shia” has several strands, such 
as Shia, Caferi, Alevi, Ismaili, Nusayri, and Bektaşi. With 
their social and regional differences, these identities be-
came more varied mainly due to tribal divisions. Some-
times tribal identity was considered the most important 
component of one’s identity by not only the members 
of the group but also the Ottoman and Turkish states. 
These characteristics would create further obstacles to 
analysing the government policies. For instance, if the 
1915 Deportation Law was for the Gregorian Armeni-
ans, which the Turkish historiography claims, or for all 
Armenians, it would be indeed difficult to determine 
whether a policy targeted the entire group or a “sub-
group”.
63  For more details see Douki and Minard 2007.
The other challenge is to find out whether the identity 
difference (besides religion) influenced the open-door 
policy of governments. We know that the Ottoman Afri-
can Muslims migrated least, from the regions occupied 
by British, French, and Italians. But was this due to the 
racial difference or the difference in different Western 
colonial policies (i.e. Russian vs British)? On the oth-
er hand, the impact of linguistic identity on the ODP 
decision is clear. We know that the language of Mus-
lim migrants had gained in importance by 1908. The 
non-Turkophone were dispersed in Anatolia in order to 
facilitate their learning Turkish,64 and the Turkish lan-
guage had become an important criteria by the time 
of the founding of the republic. But was language also 
an important factor before 1908? The other question to 
answer is the impact of knowledge of Turkish on the de-
cision of return-migration. We know that if the return- 
migration was strong among Bosnian migrants, it was 
because of their Turkish language difficulties.65 The last 
dimension of identity is tribalism. Tribalism was a of in 
migration policies; for instance, the tribalism among 
Nogays and Circassians was seen a threat to the state 
and Islam, since their asabiya was seen an obstacle be-
tween state and tebaa direct relations, especially the 
Circassian asabiyah (xabze). It is for this reason the 
Young Turks unified tribal affairs and migration affairs 
in one directorate. Since the impact of tribalism is clear, 
the question to answer is how to separate and distin-
guish the anti-tribalism policy from the-migration poli-
cy, and were they mixed in some cases?
64  Dündar 2001.
65  Şen 2015: 333.
Fig. 6: The immigration towards the Ottoman Empire and Turkey between 1856 and 1988 (© Fuat Dündar, 2021).
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Magnitude of migrations and data  
The third methodological difficulty derives from the 
magnitude of migrations and the problem of measur-
ing them. Indeed, examining the role of the population 
and identity policy in massive and enduring migrations 
means to come face to face with three difficulties: ex-
ceptionalism, measurement, and reliability of data.
Generalisation of migration policies and practices ex-
tenuates exceptional and individual dimensions. Excep-
tions in the general migration policy are multiple, which 
creates difficulties for this project. Sometimes, the atti-
tude toward individual migration could be differentiat-
ed from mass migration. For example, the migration of 
“Muslim Turks” from Western Thrace and the Gagauz 
(Christian Turks) from Romania were not accepted and 
even prevented during the republican period. However, 
on the individual level this policy was sometimes not 
applied. Some were able not only to enter, but also to 
gain citizenship.66 On the other hand, since most migra-
tion took place as a result of state policies, the project 
excludes the role of migrants in decision-making. This 
approach extenuates exceptional and individual di-
mensions. Although migrations were caused by macro 
politics and wars, the reasons could be different for in-
dividual migrants. The migrants had their own reasons 
such as family reunification, better education, and eco-
nomic/commercial concerns. How can one evaluate 
the different impact of migration policies on individu-
al applications, and what produced exceptions to the 
general policy?
The importance of data in migration studies has been 
well known since the founder of migration studies E.G. 
Ravenstein based his theory on the 1881 British census. 
The migration data is also important for this project, 
which covers mass and enduring migrations. Population 
and identity politics, which were two reasons for pro-mi-
gration policies, are directly related to the quantity of 
migration in the Ottoman/Turkish context. Muslim mi-
grants contributed to this issue during the  transforma-
tion from empire to republic, during which the political 
borders were redrawn according to “national” numbers. 
Concretely speaking, the Muslim migrants increased the 
number and proportion of Muslims in the multi-religious 
Ottoman Empire and of Turks in the multi-ethnic Turkey.
However, it is a challenge to determine the exact num-
ber of migrants. The data presented by the literature 
on the departure and arrival of migrants seem unre-
liable. For instance, the renowned expert Kemal Kar-
pat argues that the number of Crimean migrants was 
between 0,6 and 2 million.67 The  literature also exag-
gerates the number of migrants. For example, accord-
ing to Tekeli,68 the number of migrants for the period 
66  Hersant 2008, Çağaptay 2006.
67  Karpat 1985: 68–69.
68  1,8 million Crimean Tatar immigrants in 1783–1922, 1,5 million 
Caucasian immigrants in 1859-1879, 1,5 million Balkan immi-
grants in 1877–1878, and 640,000 Balkan immigrants after the 
Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. I. Tekeli, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan 
Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu”, 
Toplum ve Bilim 50, 1990: 56–57.
1783–1922 was 3,94 million. McCarthy,69 on the other 
hand, argues that it is 4,000,381  for 1827–1922, while 
Quataert70 estimates 5 to 7 million (1783–1913), Qua-
taert and Inalcik71 is 5 million (1850–1922), and Karpat 
5 million (1854–1908).72





























These differences are not only due to technical diffi-
culties but also to the ideological approaches of these 
researchers. In their reasoning, the higher the num-
ber of migrants, the more cruel the non-Muslim and 
non-Turkish states and the more victimised Muslims 
and Turks would be. In contrast to the findings sug-
gested by these works, the data prepared by the Otto-
man bureaucrats of the period are significantly lower. 
For example, according to the Interior Ministry data of 
1918, the number of Caucasian migrants was 400,000 
69  McCarthy 1995: 339.
70  D. Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922, 2nd ed., Bingham-
ton University, State University of New York, 2005: 117.
71  D. Quataert and H. İnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the 
Ottoman Empire, Cambridge University Press, 1994: 793–94.
72  Karpat 1985, 11. He estimates the numbers of Circassians at 
700,000 – 1 million in the 1860s and at least half a million in 
1881–1914, see pages 68, 70. Interestingly, in another study he 
estimates 7 million for the period from 1856 to 1914, K.H. Karpat, 
”Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern 
Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk“, in Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, 
Leiden, Boston and Köln, Brill, 2000, 22.
73 This table is the compilation of sources cited in the footnotes 67–
74 as well as the following sources: Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye’nin 
1313 senesine Mahsus Istastik-i Umûmisi (îstatistik-i Umûmi Idaresi 
Nezaret-i Umûr-ı Ticaret ve Nafıa), İstanbul 1316, 40–41. İçduygu; 
A., and Kirişci, K., Land of diverse migrations. Istanbul, Bilgi Univer-
sity Press, 2009; Doğanay, H. Dıştan Anadolu’ya göçün nüfus artışı 
üzerindeki etkilerine genel bir bakış, Edebiyat Fakültesi Araştırma 
Dergisi, 2, 12, 1980, Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, Sevinç Matbaası, 
351–378, https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-korumamiz-altindaki-suri-
yeliler.
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post-1864, and 87,760 for the period 1878–1881. Ac-
cording to the Immigration Directorate (AMMU), the 
number of recorded migrants was 1,193,944 between 
1876–1916.74 Immigration Director Hamdi Bey gave the 
number of migrants between 1878–1918 as 1,304,870 
in his parliamentary speech in 1918. The number of 
those who came after the Balkan Wars was also lower 
in the documents of the period. For example, accord-
ing to the İkdam newspaper, the number of Balkan mi-
grants between November 1912 and March 1914 was 
242,807.75
Besides the numbers, the historical sequence, in other 
words the time of migration, is also important for the 
project. An histogram of migrations can serve to find the 
causes of migrations. It would determine whether the 
migration happened in wartime or peacetime, which 
would help to better understand the relationship be-
tween war-diplomacy-migration as well as the causes, 
processes, and consequences of migration. Since the lit-
erature argues that the Ottoman-Turkish pro- migration 
policy was based on humanitarian concerns, the histor-
ical sequence will help to distinguish war-time refugees 
and peace-time migrants.
Last but not least, another important difficulty of re-
search is the generalisation of the multi-layered char-
acter of migrations. To portray these multiple layers of 
a migration wave, the Crimean migrations could be giv-
en as a striking example. Following the 1774 treaty, the 
royals and nobles left the Crimean Khanate. The second 
wave followed the annexation of Crimea to Russia. The 
third wave, yet the first massive wave, of migration be-
gan during the Crimean War, when the Russian depor-
tation policy targeted the Muslims who lived in coastal 
and other strategic regions. The deportation was exe-
cuted to prevent the disembarkment of the Otto man 
Empire and its allies. This operation triggered Muslim 
emigration to the Ottoman lands. The fourth wave was 
organised by the Ottomans and their allies. During their 
military advance, but especially toward the end of war, 
they transfered a share of the Crimean Muslims. This 
migrant transfer was intertwined with a soldier trans-
fer.76 The fifth wave consisted of those who feared that 
Russia would assume them to be collaborators. The 
more the fear of massacre spread, the more migration 
increased. This fear was reinforced by the attacks by 
Russian and local forces on collaborators. Indeed, it 
assumed the scale of a massacre consisting of looting 
and vengeful violence on the part of local and paramili-
tary forces (in the beginning, Russian Cossacks). 
The implementation of military hegemony in the region 
increased emigration via the expulsion of rebellious el-
ements and the dismissal of collaborators with the Ot-
tomans. The next step was colonisation with “loyal” el-
ements (similar to the Ottoman’s şenlendirme policy) of 
the areas destroyed during war, and settlement of mi-
74  See Table 1 of Murat Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrûkesi, 
Everest, 2015.
75  İkdam, Vº 6173, 29 April 1914, BOA, 2398/5, 2.5.1918, MAZC, 3, 4, 
2, 41: 217. MMZC, 3, 1, 1, 26, 6.7.1914: 606–14.
76  Saydam 1997.
grants coming from outside of Russia. The sixth wave 
of migration took place after all conflict had ended, 
during the establishment of the Russian administra-
tion in the region. The change of sovereignty reversed 
the governer-governed relationship. Muslims who 
could not digest this change emigrated. Those whose 
lands had been confiscated by Russia also emigrated. 
Russia redistributed land with a new land regime as it 
seized Crimean land holdings, primarily strategic and 
fertile lands. Other causes were the military, taxation, 
and Russian language and anti-Islam regulations. 
The seventh wave of migration took place during peace-
time, which extended over long span, and human loss-
es were low. The reasons remain lighter than the previ-
ous ones. Fear for one’s life is replaced by desire for a 
better life and identity concerns (i.e. to live one’s Islamic 
beliefs). This was the reason for the migration during 
the republican period. As the literature emphasises, the 
reasons for the migration from Yugoslavia, Romania 
and Bulgaria to Turkey included conversion and assim-
ilationist policies, forced changes of their names, op-
pression and persecution. However, this kind of gener-
alisation ignores that not all conquering states at all 
times intended to assimilate or drive out conquered 
Muslim populations.77 
In sum, there was no single reason for migration over 
time. Most of the Ottoman/Turkish migrations were 
connected to each other and they also had their own 
particularities. The challenge here is how to espcape 
from the simplification and banalisation of diverse and 
varied migrations?
“Dis-conclusion”: theoretical questions
The first challenge to theorising derives from the rather 
complicated and sensitive research subject. The sec-
ond derives from migration theory itself. Most of the 
theories are Euro-Western centered. They are mod-
eled not on empires but on nation-states. They deal 
with the issue mainly in terms of social and economic 
integration. They examine individual cases of migra-
tion rather than mass scales. Moreover, migrants are 
considered rational individuals. On the other hand, 
refugee studies, which is not enough to explain peace-
time migrations in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 
is relatively more limited, and refugee-centered, mini-
mising states’ agency. 
Migration research is contemporary oriented and in-
terested in forecasting. Migrations are rarely recog-
nised as factors that constitute history. The integra-
tion of perspectives from area studies and mobility 
research has so far not led to enough inclusion of the 
importance of historical structures and cultural knowl-
edge.
Whatever the reason for their production, theories are 
able to offer appropriate paradigms. Since a theory 
can not explain migration in all its dimensions, stud-
ies of migration have to adopt an inter-disciplinary 
approach. The most appropriate and inclusive theory 
77  See for example, N. Immig, Zwischen Partizipation und Emigra-
tion Muslime in Griechenland 1878–1897, Wiesbaden, Harrasso-
witz, 2015.
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seems to be the “migration system” theory because the 
Ottoman/Turkish migrations took place for mainly po-
litical reasons (i.e. states) and the effect of pre- existing 
links between countries where migration took place 
was decisive. Most migrations (at least until the 1990s) 
that occurred with macro-political, ethnic and security 
concerns, were state-sponsored migrations. Few migra-
tion from Russia to the Ottoman Empire and from the 
Balkans to Turkey were not independent of these pa-
rameters because most of these movements stemmed 
from institutional relations between states, rather than 
the migrants’ own decisions.78
In addition to the migration system theory, the most 
appropriate and explanatory paradigm are push and 
pull factors. This project will make it clear that it is im-
portant to supplement this paradigm with a knowledge 
analysis approach.
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